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Making votes count in parliament or government? 
 
Abstract 
Several scholars have sought to elucidate voting strategies in proportional representation 
systems. The argument is that the existence of coalition governments forces voters to 
consider potential alliances and to vote in order to maximize their chances of influencing 
the outcome. In this paper we argue that this vision is incomplete as proportional 
representation, just as single-member district plurality, also creates incentives for voters 
to desert parties that have little chances of obtaining a seat in their district. We validate 
this theoretical claim using two different surveys conducted during the 2014 Belgian 
federal and regional elections. Our results show that both government and district 
viability have a substantial and distinct effect on vote choice. 
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There is a vast literature, starting with Duverger (1951), which shows that voters do not 
necessarily always vote the party that they like most. They also take into account how 
their vote may affect the result of the election; they want to make their vote count (Cox 
1997). This leads some to cast a strategic vote, that is, a vote for a party that is not the 
preferred one, for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the election (Blais et al. 
2001). 
 
The first studies on strategic voting focused on single-member district plurality (SMP) 
elections (Alvarez and Nagler 2000; Blais and Nadeau 1996; Heath and Evans 1994; 
Franklin, Niemi, and Whitten 1994). However, more recent research shows that strategic 
voting is as frequent under proportional representation (PR) (Abramson et al. 2010; Blais 
and Gschwend 2010; Hobolt and Karp 2010). Yet, according to this literature, strategic 
voting takes a different form under two electoral systems. While SMP creates incentives 
for voters to desert their most preferred party if this party has little chances of winning in 
their district, the existence of coalition governments, and of parties bargaining over their 
composition, is said to induce voters to consider the chances of each party entering the 
ruling coalition, and to vote to maximize their chances of influencing the outcome 
(Bargsted and Kedar 2009; Blais et al. 2006; Blais, Erisen, and Rheault 2014; Duch, 
May, and Armstrong 2010; Indridason 2011; Meffert and Gschwend 2011). 
 
In this paper we argue that this vision of strategic voting under PR is incomplete. Just as 
in SMP, voters should also desert their most preferred party if this party has little chances 
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of obtaining a seat in their district, as Cox and Shugart (1996) and Cox (1997) already 
claimed (for a discussion of their findings, see further). The underlying assumption is that 
voters care about both (1) the policies are implemented by the governing parties, and (2) 
the parties that represent them in parliament. We argue that the study of strategic voting 
in PR systems should therefore take into account both government and district viability. 
We offer evidence of this theoretical claim in analysing two surveys conducted during the 
2014 federal and regional elections in Belgium. Belgium is a typical case of PR country 
with medium-size districts and coalition governments. We show that both government 
and district viability have a significant, substantial and – more importantly – distinct 
effect on vote choice. 
 
Strategic voting under PR 
Strategic voting is defined as the practice of voting for a different party than one’s 
favourite in order to affect the outcome (Blais et al. 2001). The policies that are 
effectively implemented during the upcoming legislature are the ultimate outcome of an 
election. In representative democracies, the nature of these policies depends on the 
partisan composition of the government, which itself (partly) depends on the partisan 
composition of the parliament. 
 
Voting strategically to influence the coalition composition under PR is complex for two 
reasons. First, under PR rules the range of mathematically possible coalitions is (often) 
high, making it harder to identify post-electoral coalitions (Downs, 1957). However, 
Herrmann (2014) argues that voters have other tools at their disposal to reduce the 
4 
 
number of viable coalitions to more practical levels. In PR systems parties often signal 
their post-electoral intentions to the electorate and sometimes go as far as to form pre-
electoral alliances (Golder, 2006, Debus 2007). But even in the absence of coalition 
signals, parties still tend to adhere to a criterion of ideological closeness and form more 
or less ideologically consistent coalitions because this facilitates policymaking (Laver 
and Budge 1992, Müller and Strøm, 1999, 2003). According to Herrmann (2014) these 
constraints allow for strategic considerations under PR rules, even though they do not 
necessarily lead to a clearly defined set of outcomes and the context of each election still 
has great impact on the predictability of post-election coalition outcomes. 
 
The second reason for complexity under PR is that government composition is not a 
direct function of parliamentary seats (Indridason 2011). In countries using PR, 
governments are composed of various parties that represent a majority of parliamentary 
seats and that agree to form a coalition. The composition of the government therefore 
depends on both parliamentary seats and pre- and post-election bargaining between 
parties. Voters thus have to anticipate this bargaining and should concentrate their votes 
on parties that are likely to enter government. In doing so, they maximize their chances of 
affecting the composition of the government. Imagine a far right voter that realizes that 
her preferred party has virtually no chance of entering the government coalition because 
its agenda is considered too extreme. Faced with the possibility of a center-left coalition, 
she might consider strategically abandoning her preferred party – even when this party is 





Cox (1997) also described another possible strategic vote in PR systems where there is a 
formal or informal rule to grant the initiative to form the government to the largest party. 
Assuming that there are three parties (A, B and C) that are viable at the district level and 
that party B has no chance of becoming the largest party, supporters of B might be 
inclined to vote for A or C (depending on their second preference) because they want to 
increase the probability of a AB or BC coalition.1 Even though this motive is certainly 
strategic, our study is not able to account for it because it would assume a voter to 
abandon a preferred party with high levels of district and government viability in favour 
of a party with lower government viability. 
 
The theoretical claim that voters anticipate post-election bargaining and concentrate their 
votes on parties that are likely to enter government in order to maximize their impact on 
government composition has been validated by various empirical studies. In a 
comparative analysis of PR countries, Duch et al. (2010) show that voters are able to 
anticipate potential post-election coalitions during the campaign, even in countries where 
parties do not signal what would be their preferred partners, and to adapt their vote choice 
accordingly. As Blais et al. (2006) point out in their case study of Israel, perceptions of 
potential coalitions influence vote choice independently of classical determinants of 
voting behaviour, namely ideology, party preference and candidate characteristics. 
Focusing on Israel, Bargsted and Kedar (2009) identify more precisely the ideological 
dimension of strategic coalition voting. They find that leftist voters desert the Labour 
                                                          
1 Another condition for this type of strategic vote is that party B has a pivotal role between A and C, so that 
the possibility of an AC coalition does not exist. 
6 
 
Party when the party is unlikely to participate in a government coalition and opt for a 
centrist party instead, which is ‘the lesser evil’ in their mind. Studying vote choice in 
Germany, Gschwend (2007) and Shikano et al. (2009) show that there is also another 
type of strategic coalition voting: supporters of the senior coalition party (CDU) 
sometimes use their second vote to support the junior coalition partner (FDP) in order to 
help this party obtain representation in parliament and to increase the chances that the 
coalition will conquer a majority of seats (see also Meffert and Gschwend 2011). Cox 
(1997) labeled this type of strategic voting threshold insurance voting. Fredén (2014) 
shows a similar pattern for the Christian Democrat party in Sweden using the 2010 
Swedish National Election Study.2  
 
The basic assumption behind strategic voting is that some voters do not want to ‘waste’ 
their vote by supporting a party that has little chance of influencing the outcome. Under 
PR, this means not voting for a party that has little chance of entering the governing 
coalition. However, a voter may still waste her vote in another way. 
 
Under SMP, the party that obtains the largest seat share forms the government. Because 
the electoral rule tends to advantage large parties, the winning party usually obtains a 
majority of parliamentary seats. The distribution of parliamentary seats thus directly 
decides which party forms the government. Accordingly, if voters aim at affecting the 
electoral outcome, they have to cast a vote in favour of a party that has some chance of 
                                                          
2 Note that these studies do not deal with the specific type of strategic voting that we are interested in this 
paper, that is, not voting for the preferred party because that party is perceived to have little chance of being 




winning in their district, i.e. a viable district party, even if this means deserting their most 
preferred party. In doing so, they maximize their chances of influencing the composition 
of the parliament, the government, and the overall policy direction. Empirical studies 
show that this concerns a substantial amount of supporters of small parties that are 
unlikely to obtain a seat in their district (Alvarez and Nagler 2000; Blais et al. 2001; 
Franklin, Niemi, and Whitten 1994). 
 
As mentioned above, most studies that deal with formal thresholds and strategic voting 
under PR focus on threshold insurance voting, i.e. the strategic desertion of viable parties 
in order to enable a preferred post-electoral coalition. Perhaps surprisingly, there has been 
little empirical research on the strategic desertion of parties that are not viable at the 
district-level under PR. Cox and Shugart (1996) and Cox (1997) explore the desertion of 
weak lists both theoretically and empirically (in Chile, Colombia, and Japan). Lago 
(2008) shows that in Spain (a country where there is always a single party in government 
like in most SMP countries) small parties that did not obtain any seat in the district in the 
previous election tend to be deserted. Selb (2012) also used the strategic desertion of 
parties that are not viable at the district level in Spain as an indicator of strategic 
adaptation of voters and elites to new electoral systems. Similar to Cox and Shugart 
(1996), his study supports the idea that parties’ previous electoral performance influences 
voters’ tendencies for strategic desertion. These findings are in line with those of Gunther 
(1989), who show that the supporters of the Communist party in Spain are prone to vote 




Just as in SMP, a vote is also wasted under PR if it is cast in favour of a party unlikely to 
win a seat in the district. A party that is not represented in the legislature does not 
participate in coalition bargaining. Even opposition parties can exert some influence over 
policies in participating in committees or in asking questions to the government during 
plenary sessions. By contrast, parties have little influence on the ultimate policy outcome 
when they are not in parliament. What is more, our expectation is that voters pay 
attention not only to government but also to district viability because they care not only 
about ultimate policy outcomes but also about whether their views and concerns are 
represented in parliament. It is because of the presence of such concerns that among 
supporters of opposition parties those who voted for parties with seats in the legislature 
are more satisfied with the way democracy works than those who voted for parties with 
no seats (Blais et al. forthcoming). For these reasons, a voter who prefers a party unlikely 
to obtain a seat in her district thus has to turn to another party that does have district 
viability if she wants to influence the post-electoral bargaining game between parties that 
obtained parliamentary representation.  
 
We are not aware of any study that examines and compares the effects of government and 
district viability on vote choice under PR simultaneously. Our paper aims to fill this gap 
and to contribute to a deeper understanding of what motivates some voters to cast a 
strategic vote in this context. The two types of viability are of course likely to be 
correlated, as major parties that are viable at the government level are also likely to be 
viable in most districts. However, the situation is different in the case of small parties. 
They are often viable only in the largest districts and perceptions about whether they have 
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a chance of being in government vary a lot. As a consequence, government and district 
viability can be distinguished, as we do in this research. We expect that both viabilities 
have a positive – yet separate – effect on vote choice among parties that are liked by the 
voter.  
 
We also expect that voters pay more attention to government than to district viability. As 
mentioned above, the theory regarding strategic voting supposes that the policy impact of 
a party is more important when this party is in government. Being represented in the 
legislature is nice, being represented in the government is even better. Also, the 
mechanical effect of PR systems is such that many parties are viable at the level of the 
district. Therefore, considerations related to district viability only concern the supporters 
of small parties. By contrast, considerations related to government viability concern all 
voters. 
 
This expectation is in line with the dominant view in the literature that most of the power 
in contemporary democracies is concentrated in hands of the executive (Norton 1990). 
Furthermore, the media give more coverage to party leaders, Prime Ministers, and other 
important cabinet members than to parliament as such (Bittner 2011; Karvonen 2012). 
We thus expect people to care more about which parties will form the government than 
about which ones will and will not be represented in the legislature. 
 
Belgium as a case study 
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To test the relative importance of government and district viability on vote choice, we 
focus on the case of the 2014 federal election in Belgium and 2014 regional elections in 
the two main regions of the country (Flanders and Wallonia).3 Belgium uses a PR system 
with districts of different sizes. In the districts we are covering in our study, the 
magnitude ranges from 4 to 33, with a mean of 16.44. As a consequence, there is 
important variation in the district viability of the parties included in this study – these are 
the parties with at least one seat in the incumbent parliament and those that obtained at 
least one per cent of the votes in 2014, with the exception of the FN in Wallonia that did 
not participate in any of the two elections although they had some seats in the regional 
parliament. This gives us variation on the effective threshold of representation, and thus 
district viability. 
  
Although the major parties were guaranteed to obtain at least one seat in almost all of the 
districts, this was not the case of medium-size and small parties. In Flanders, the green 
party (Groen) and radical right party (VB) – both have a parliamentary representation 
since 1980 – did not obtain any seat in the federal district of Limburg (magnitude of 
twelve). In Wallonia, the Christian-democratic party (CDH), which was part of the 
incumbent federal government coalition, did not obtain any seat in the federal district of 
Brabant-Wallon (magnitude of five), while the green party (Ecolo) suffered the same fate 
in the federal district of Luxembourg (magnitude of four). Furthermore, in both regions, 
                                                          
3 Both of these elections, together with the European election that we do not consider here, were held on the 
very same day. We exclude the regional election of Brussels and the federal district of Brussels, both of 
which are complicated cases since voters have the choice to vote on two types of ballot depending on their 
linguistic affiliation. For a general description of the specificity of the Belgian party system, see De Winter, 
Swyngedouw, and Dumont (2006). 
4 Our study covers 10 federal electoral districts and 18 regional electoral districts (5 Flemish, 13 Walloon). 
These are all of the electoral districts except Brussels (for both levels). 
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there were several small parties that were unsure to obtain seats in most districts such as 
the populist right party (LDD) in Flanders, which was a small incumbent legislative party 
at both the federal and regional level, or the radical left party in Flanders (PVDA) and in 
Wallonia (PTB) – this last party obtained parliamentary seats in both the regional and 
federal parliament for the first time in its history. 
 
The presence of PR with relatively large districts and the juxtaposition of two party 
systems in the two regions (in federal elections) contribute to a highly fragmented party 
system. Actually, the federal parliament of the country is one of the most fragmented 
among modern democracies (Lijphart 1999). In all three parliaments covered in this study 
(the federal parliament and the Flemish and Walloon regional parliaments), at least three 
parties obtained more than 15% of the seats, with no party obtaining more than 40%.  
 
As a consequence of this fragmentation, regional and federal governments have always 
been coalitions, sometimes including as many as six parties. The institutional system 
requires governments to be supported by a majority of parliamentary seats, and at the 
federal level to include at least one party of each linguistic group. In 2014, the 
composition of the governments that would be formed after the election was uncertain for 
at least two reasons. 
 
First, the coalition signals were weak. None of the parties mentioned a clear preference 
for governing with another party, at the exceptions of the green parties (Groen in 
Flanders, Ecolo in Wallonia) that indicated that they would enter government together. 
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The other parties simply made clear that they would refuse to form a government with the 
radical right parties (VB in Flanders, and PP in Wallonia) given their extreme position on 
various issues, especially against immigration. The only other negative signal came from 
the two largest parties of the two regions. The regionalist party in Flanders (N-VA) and 
the social-democratic party in Wallonia (PS), which both obtained about 30% of the votes 
in their respective regions, declared that they would not govern together at the federal 
level (Dandoy, Reuchamps, and Baudewyns 2015).  
 
Second, for about 20 years, Belgian parties have not followed an ideological proximity 
criterion when it comes to government formation. Right- and left-wing parties have 
governed together multiple times (De Winter, Swyngedouw, and Dumont 2006). 
Furthermore, ten out of the fifteen parties included in this study took part in at least one 
government during this period. Next to the parties from the Christian-democratic (CD&V 
in Flanders, CDH in Wallonia), liberal (Open VLD in Flanders, MR in Wallonia), and 
social-democratic families (SP.A in Flanders, PS in Wallonia), both the green (Groen in 
Flanders; Ecolo in Wallonia) and the regionalist parties (N-VA in Flanders, FDF in 
Brussels and Wallonia) were the junior partners of a coalition at some point. The game 
was thus rather open, which explains why voters had very different perceptions regarding 
the potential composition of the governments (see below).  
 
Table 1 shows the parties included in the analysis together with their share of votes in 
their respective regions in the 2014 federal and regional elections. Ultimately, the 
Flemish regional (N-VA) and Christian-democratic parties (CD&V) formed the federal 
government together with the two liberal parties (Open VLD in Flanders, MR in 
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Wallonia). The MR obtained the Prime Minister given its pivotal position. At the regional 
level, the N-VA, the CD&V, and the Open VLD formed the Flemish government, 
whereas the social-democratic (PS) and the Christian-democratic (CDH) parties formed 
the Walloon government. 
 
Data and variables 
To test our theoretical claim about strategic voting under PR, we rely on two pre-election 
surveys (conducted in the weeks preceding Election Day) that sampled between 500 and 
1,000 respondents in each of the two regions covered. The two surveys used different 
sampling and interviewing techniques. The first one (PartiRep) is a face-to-face survey 
conducted with a representative sample of randomly selected adult citizens in the national 
population registry. The second one (Making Electoral Democracy Work) is an online 
survey conducted with a panel of adult citizens selected on a quota basis, thus ensuring 
the diversity of the sample. We use the first survey to study vote choice at the federal 
level, and the second to study vote choice at the regional level.  
 




Our analysis focuses on four central variables: vote choice (the dependent variable), 
government viability, district viability, and party preference (the independent variables). 
We expect vote choice to be a function of party preference on the one hand (as in a 
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‘sincere’ or non-strategic vote choice model), and government and district viability on the 
other (as in our strategic vote choice model under PR). 
 
Vote choice is the party that the respondent indicated she intended to vote for in the 
upcoming federal or regional election (depending on the survey). Party preference is 
tapped with a question asking people to tell how much they like/dislike each of the 
parties included in the analysis on a scale from zero (not liking at all) to ten (liking a 
lot)5. Government viability is measured with a question asking respondents to rate the 
chances of each of the parties6 to be part of the federal or regional government on a scale 
from zero (very unlikely) to ten (very likely)7. 
 
Given the high uncertainty regarding the composition of the upcoming government 
during the campaign (see above), this type of subjective measure of government viability 
is preferable. Unfortunately, a similar question regarding the chances of each party to 
gain parliamentary representation in the respondent’s district was not asked in either of 
the two surveys. We thus created a district viability proxy, using the actual results of the 
2014 federal and regional election per district. We used a logit model to regress a dummy 
indicating whether a party obtained a seat in the district on district magnitude, the party’s 
                                                          
5 Regional survey (online): “Evaluate the following political parties on a scale from 0 to 10 (where 0 means 
you do not like that party at all and 10 means you like that party a lot” / Federal survey (face-to-face): 
“There are many political parties in our country. I would like to know how much you like these parties. 
You can give each party a score between 0 and 10, where 0 means you do not like the party at all and 10 
means you like the party a lot. The more you like a party, the more points you can give to that party. If you 
don’t know a party or believe you know it insufficiently, please do not hesitate to tell us.” 
6 We did not ask the likelihood of the Flemish radical right party (VB) entering government in the regional 
survey. As all the other parties declared they would refuse to govern with it, we set the value of the 
government viability of this party to zero for all respondents. 
7 “Could you indicate, on a scale from 0 to 10 (where 0 means not likely at all and 10 means very likely) 
for each of the following parties how likely you believe it is that they will be part of the next 
[Flemish/Walloon/Federal] government?”  
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vote share in the district, and an interaction between the two. These are the elements a 
voter would take into account when determining district viability. We then use the 
predicted probability of each party winning at least one seat in the respondent’s district as 
our measure of district viability. This strategy brings an interesting nuance compared to a 
simple dummy district viability variable, especially for small parties that were close to 
obtaining a seat8. 
 
We are well aware of the fact that the two viability variables are not measured the same 
way and that this might create a comparability problem. However, even though this 
presents us with limitations concerning our analyses, we also believe that district viability 
was much less uncertain than government viability during the 2014 campaign, and that 
our objective measure of the former reflects voter’s subjective evaluations. Some studies 
show that voters manage to update their expectations regarding the chances of the parties 
in their district on the basis of the polls released during the campaign (Guinjoan et al. 
2014; Blais and Bodet 2006). However, we also replicated our analyses with the results 
of previous elections (2010 for federal, and 2009 for regional elections) in order to check 
the robustness of our results.  
 
Table 1 reports the averages of the three independent variables (that have been 
standardized from zero to one) for each of the party for each election. For all the results 
presented in this paper, respondents are weighted so that the overall distribution of vote 
intentions matches the actual electoral results. We can distinguish two groups of parties, 
                                                          
8 The distribution of the district and government viability variables can be found in Figures A and B in the 
appendix. For district viability thirty per cent of the observations have a viability lower than 0.5. 
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those with a mean preference rating around 0.5 and those with a mean below 0.4, which 
are much less liked overall. Unsurprisingly, these ratings are correlated with vote 
intentions. The parties with a low overall mean always get less than 10% of the vote, 
usually between 3% and 5%. There are, however, some parties with high average 
preference ratings that receive relatively few votes, the most striking case being the green 
parties (Groen in Flanders, Ecolo in Wallonia); these two parties have ratings around 0.5 
yet get less than 10% of the vote. 
 
When it comes to district viability, there are three groups of parties: the largest group is 
composed of the ‘main’ parties, which are viable everywhere (viability score above 0.9), 
the very small parties (PVDA, LDD, and FDF) that are non-viable everywhere (viability 
score under 0.1), and a few other parties (VB and PTB) that are viable only in some 
districts. Note that Ecolo belongs to that category in the federal election, because of the 
smaller district magnitude. 
 
Finally the government viability scores underline the fact that it is more difficult to 
predict which parties will be in and out of government. All the main parties are given 
relatively good chances (between 0.4 and 0.8, on average) but none is perceived to be 
almost certain to be part of the coalition government. The small parties usually get a 
score around 0.2. We also observe that voters’ perceptions are rather in line with the 
actual composition of governments. In Flanders, the three parties that entered the regional 
and federal governments (N-VA, CD&V and VLD) are those with the highest scores. The 
same is true concerning the two parties that formed the regional government in Wallonia 
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(PS and CDH). However, the only francophone party that entered the federal government 
(MR) is second in terms of (average) government viability. The PS comes first, probably 
because it was part of the incumbent federal government (together with MR and other 
parties from Flanders). 
 
Results 
In order to determine the presence of strategic voting, we need to evaluate whether the 
viability variables have a significant positive effect on the probability to vote for a party, 
which would indicate that voters are more inclined to vote for more viable parties, even 
when controlling for their party preferences. To test this hypothesis, we estimate 
conditional logit models with vote intention being the dependent variable, and party 
preference and the two viability indicators the independent variables. The unit of analysis 
is the party/respondent. 
 




Model 1 in Table 2 reports the results of the baseline model. In line with the literature on 
strategic voting under PR, we only include government viability and party preferences. 
We observe that, as expected, both coefficients are positive and statistically significant. 
In Model 2, we add the district viability variable. We see that the two viability 
coefficients are highly significant and have the predicted positive sign, indicating that, 
everything else being equal, voters are more prone to vote for a party that is viable in 
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their district and that has more chance of being in government. What is more, we observe 
that, in both federal and regional elections, the coefficient associated to government 
viability is smaller compared to the baseline model. This suggests that it is important to 
include both viabilities in models predicting vote choice in PR systems. Table A in the 
appendix shows that the results are essentially similar when we calculate district viability 
using the previous elections’ results. The bottom line, is that it would be misleading to 
interpret the vote as a mere expression of voters’ preferences. 
 
We are also interested in comparing the effects of district viability and government 
viability. Without much surprise, we also observe that preference matters more than 
viability given that the coefficient associated to this variable is much larger. The results 
in Table 2 indicate that government viability matters more for the federal elections. The 
two viability coefficients of Model 2 are statistically different at a level of p < .05 in the 
case of the federal election but for the regional elections this is not the case. We conclude 
that Belgian voters are influenced at least as much (and perhaps more in the case of 
federal elections) by the parties’ chances of being in government as by their viability in 
their district. As to complete this comparison, we also estimate Model 2 with 
standardized variables (Z-scores). Results are identical: the coefficient associated to 
government viability is significantly larger than the one associated to parliament viability, 
but only in the federal election (see Table B in the appendix). 
 
However, we cannot make any definitive statement regarding the magnitude of the effect 
of the two viabilities given that we do not use the same indicator for government and 
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district viability. We thus simply conclude that government viability matters at least as 
much as district viability, and that the two have a distinct effect on vote choice. We also 
estimated models where we interacted government and district viability. The interaction 
between the two variables is small and not significant (see below), which suggests that 
the two have a distinct effect on vote choice. 
 
As we briefly mentioned before, Table 2 shows that the effect of government viability on 
vote choice is larger for the federal election. The reason for this may be that, in Belgium 
at least, government viability is more straightforward at the regional level: the only 
parties forming the regional coalition are the ones that were directly competing with each 
on the same ballot. This is not the case at the federal level, where parties from both sides 
of the country have to form a government, whereas voters only see ‘their side’s’ (or their 
language group’s) parties on the ballot. It is thus reasonable to assume that it is easier for 
voters to predict which party will be in government at the regional level. Also, this may 
be due to the classic curse of regional elections: because of their second-order nature, 
voters care less about which party wins. That said, these explanations are tentative given 
that we only compare one federal election, and two regional elections in our study. 
 
A strategic voter votes for a party that she likes and is viable. There should thus be an 
interaction effect between preference and viability. The third model in Table 2 therefore 
includes interaction terms between preference and district viability, and preference and 
government viability9. The inclusion of these interaction terms makes it difficult to 
                                                          
9 In order to examine all potential interactions, we also ran a fourth model that includes a three-way 
interaction between preference and district and government viability. The marginal effect plots of these 
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correctly interpret the coefficients in the model. However, the marginal effect plots in 
Figure 1 and 2 make it easier to understand how the variables in our model interact. 
 
Figure 1. Marginal effect of district and government viability on vote choice for the 






Figure 2. Marginal effect of district and government viability on vote choice for the 






As we can see from both Figure 1 and 2, all four marginal effects go in the predicted 
(positive) direction once the preference values for a party exceed 0.5. This indicates that 
voters make potentially strategic vote choices between parties they at least somewhat like 
and that this is moderated by a utility derived from varying district and government 
viability. Three out of the four marginal effects also increase as the preference rating 
                                                                                                                                                                             
interactions can be found in the appendix (Figures C and D). As these figures show, the marginal effects of 
the three-way interactions are consistent with the effects of the two-way interactions. The marginal effect 
of district viability is stronger when government viability is high and the marginal effect of government 
viability is stronger when district viability is high, but none of these differences are statistically significant. 
We therefore opted to only report the two-way interactions in Table 2. 
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increases. The marginal effect of government viability for the federal elections is clearly 
positive, but it is impossible to determine whether this effect increases, decreases or just 
remains stable.10  
 
The different effect sizes between the election levels might hint at second-order effects 
during this simultaneous election, since the marginal effect of government viability is 
relatively stronger for the federal elections while the marginal effect of district viability is 
relatively stronger for the regional elections. This could point towards a dynamic in 
which strategic voters treated the federal elections as a first-order election and cared more 
about government composition at this level, while the regional level was considered 
second-order and strategic considerations were more skewed towards the electoral 
threshold. This remains, however, a speculation, since we did not ask respondents to 
differentiate between party preferences according to the election levels and we do not 
have any longitudinal data to support this interpretation. 
 
As to further evaluate the concrete implications of strategic voting for electoral 
competition in Belgium, we calculate what would be the vote share of each party if 
government viability, district viability, and then both district and government viability 
were maximal for all parties, that is, under a context where every party was fully viable 
and thus no party would be handicapped by lack of viability (we keep all other variables 
as their observed value). To calculate predictions, we use a specification similar to model 
                                                          
10 When we look at parties that are disliked by voters (receiving a preference score less than 0.5), increasing 
government and district viability actually negatively impacts the probability to vote for that party in three 
out of four cases (government viability at the federal elections being the exception). This effect also 
increases when the party is disliked more.  
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3 in Table 2. We use the predicted probabilities to vote for each party in the two regions 
based upon party preference, government viability, district viability, an interaction 
between party preference and government viability, and an interaction between party 
preference and district viability. We then compare the predicted vote of the respondents 
in all those situations to their predicted vote when we keep all other variables at their 
observed values.11 
 
Table 3 reports these results. Column 1 shows the predicted vote share that each party 
gets when we keep the original value of all three variables. Columns 2, 3, and 4 indicate 
how different predicted vote shares would be if every party had the maximum score of 
one on government viability (column 2), on district viability (column 3), or on both types 
of viability (column 4). We see that in this last scenario the two main parties of the two 
regions would receive fewer votes in three out of the four cases, the difference ranging 
from one to six percentage points, and the median being three points. This is a relative 
difference of about 10%, since the median vote share of these parties is 32%. We can thus 
say that the two main parties get a boost of three percentage points each (or 10%) thanks 
to the presence of these two types of strategic voting. This comes at the expense of the 
other parties, which typically get one or two percentage points fewer votes than they 
would in the absence of viability considerations, which also corresponds to a relative 
difference of 10-20%, since their median vote share is 9%. 
 
                                                          
11 We consider that respondents are predicted to vote for the party for which they have the highest predicted 
probability to vote. In case there is a tie between the predicted probabilities to vote for several parties, we 
adopt a conservative strategy, and consider that respondents are predicted to vote for the party they reported 
having the intention to vote for. 
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Looking at the independent effects of government and district viability (columns 2 and 
3), we observe that the two effects are about equally important.12 There are as many 
instances where the effect of district viability is higher as there are cases where it is the 
reverse. Overall we can observe that the general direction of the vote shift would be from 
large and/or centre parties towards smaller and ideologically more extreme ones. The 
only case in which this does not seem to hold is the federal election in Wallonia, where 
the differences in predictions are, in fact, very small compared to the other cases. 
 
Conclusion 
The literature on strategic voting has long concentrated on SMP elections. Strategic 
voting in this context concerns voters who have a preference for parties that have little 
chances of winning in their district. Some of those voters then decide to desert their 
favourite party and support a more viable party, in order to maximize their chances of 
affecting the composition of the government, and therefore the policy outcome. 
 
Recently, several scholars have studied strategic voting in PR countries. They have 
argued that strategic voting is more complex in this context given the existence of 
coalition governments, whose composition depends on both the distribution of 
                                                          
12 Note that the combined effect does not necessary equal the addition of each specific effect. The predicted 
vote may differ if only one or the other viability is neutralized, if either, or if both. And sometime (rarely), 
the two effects can cancel each other. 
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parliamentary seats and (pre- and post-electoral) bargaining between the parties. In order 
to influence the outcome of the election, strategic voters need to consider the chances of 
each party entering the governing coalition. 
 
In this paper, we argue that this vision of strategic voting under PR is incomplete. Voters 
also have incentives to desert parties that have no chance of winning a seat in their 
district, because parties without parliamentary representation can hardly participate in the 
public debate. This suggests that voters are not concerned solely with affecting the 
policies that governments adopt, they are also keen to see their views and priorities 
represented in the legislature. 
 
To our knowledge, there is no study that examines the effect of both government and 
district viability on vote choice. This is what we do in this paper by studying the 2014 
federal and regional elections in Belgium – a typical case of PR systems with coalition 
governments. Relying on data from two surveys, we find that both government and 
district viability have a substantial, distinct and positive effect on vote choice. We also 
find that the marginal effect of these viabilities on vote choice is higher among those who 
very much like their party. Our results thus bring an important contribution to the 
literature on strategic voting in PR countries, as we stress the importance of considering 
both district and government viability in order to take into account the complexity of vote 
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Table A. Effects of district and government viability on vote choice calculated with 




Table B. Effects of district and government viability on vote choice calculated with 




FIGURE A. Distribution of district viability for the 2014 Federal and Regional 






FIGURE B. Distribution of government viability for the 2014 Federal and Regional 








FIGURE C. Marginal effect of district and government viability and preference on 







FIGURE D. Marginal effect of district and government viability and preference on 
vote choice for the 2014 Regional elections (Flanders + Wallonia) 
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